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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN PRIVATE LITIGATION:
BALANCING INTERESTS IN ANONYMITY AND DISCLOSURE
Heightened pleading standards and limits on discovery in private
securities fraud actions make confidential informants crucial in many
cases. While courts have widely recognized the importance of
confidential informants and the need to protect them from retaliation,
they have not applied consistent standards for how informants must be
identified in pleadings, and have failed to take into account substantial
bodies of relevant caselaw when deciding whether to require that
informants’ names be disclosed in discovery.
This article offers a framework for when and how confidential
informants should be identified, taking into account the competing
interests in anonymity and disclosure. It offers a refined standard for
identifying informants at the pleading stage that focuses on how the
employee came to have the information pleaded, rather than on the
employee’s job title or duties. It also proposes use of in camera review of
witness statements.
At the discovery stage, this article criticizes the use of the
attorney work product doctrine as a basis for protecting informant
identities. It argues that courts should perform a balancing analysis that
directly weighs public policy and privacy interests in favor of informant
anonymity against defendants’ legitimate needs for disclosure. This
approach is supported by numerous cases protecting the identities of
informants and other types of witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and
also finds support in the many cases construing the formal privilege
applicable to government informants.
Finally, this article encourages plaintiffs to seek protective
orders for informants early in litigation and briefly discusses protection
for witness interview notes.
INTRODUCTION
Confidential informants are crucial to detecting and prosecuting
corporate wrongdoing.1 The threats of retaliation and harm to reputation,
however, serve as strong disincentives to corporate employees who
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See Part I.A. infra.

consider stepping forward.2 While individuals who report misconduct to
the government can generally rely on the “informant’s privilege” to
preserve their anonymity, no similar privilege shields the identities of
informants who speak to private plaintiffs or their counsel. As plaintiffs’
law firms – particularly in securities cases subject to the heightened
pleading standards – have hired professional investigators and
significantly expanded their pre- and post-filing investigations, the
proper treatment of such private confidential informants has become
increasingly important. Striking the proper balance between protecting
informants’ identities and fair disclosure to defendants now has
significant consequences for plaintiffs, defendants, private litigation as a
means of enforcing the nation’s laws, the legal system’s commitment to
broad discovery, and informants’ ability to perform their civic duty
without professional martyrdom.
The competing interests in shielding and disclosing informants’
identities arise at three distinct stages of litigation:
• At the pleading stage, when informants’ statements are used to
establish the legal sufficiency of a claim and defend a motion to dismiss,
particularly in securities cases subject to the heightened pleading
standards imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
19953 (“PSLRA”) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures.
• During discovery, when Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) requires that the
names of individuals “likely to have discoverable information” be
provided and defendants’ interrogatories often specifically request
disclosure of plaintiffs’ confidential informants.
• On a motion for summary judgment or at trial, when an
informant’s testimony is proffered to a judge or jury for use in
determining the merits of the controversy.
This article analyzes courts’ treatment of confidential informants
at each of these stages. Part I evaluates confidential informants’ value in
enforcement actions and informants’ need for anonymity. Parts II-IV
addresses the pleading, summary judgment/trial, and discovery stages,
respectively.
2
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Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15
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At the pleading stage, courts shield informants’ names but require
the plaintiff to provide some identifying information. Modest differences
in courts’ formulations of what information must be disclosed, however,
significantly affect the protection that informants receive. In camera
review of witness statements and supporting documentation provides one
mechanism, proposed infra, for insuring that meritorious securities fraud
cases proceed while protecting defendants from unsupported claims.
At the trial stage, the rule is simply stated: informants must
always be named.
Finally, the discovery stage presents the most difficult issues in
balancing the competing interests in anonymity and disclosure. The
securities fraud cases on point have reached inconsistent results, and
have generally failed to consider (or even acknowledge) the extensive
caselaw governing the informant’s privilege and the balancing analysis
that courts use in other cases where public policy and privacy interests
support protecting the identities of informants and other types of
witnesses. Collectively, these cases provide a coherent and nuanced
framework for balancing the competing interests in anonymity and
disclosure for confidential informants in securities fraud and other
private litigation.
I. THE VALUE OF INFORMANTS AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
A. The Importance of Confidential Informants in Prosecuting Violations
of Law
Informants serve a crucial role in detecting and prosecuting
wrongdoing. They have been described by a former FBI Director as “the
single most important tool in law enforcement”4 and have been
recognized by the Supreme Court as “a vital part of society’s defensive
arsenal.”5 Even commentators who are critical of informant-related
abuses recognize informants as “a necessary evil.”6 Informants can be
divided into two categories: the “vast majority”7 who “trade[]
4

ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS
IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (2002) (quoting William Webster).
5
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967).
6
Bloom, supra note 4, at 158.
7
26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5702, at 354 (1992).

3

information for money or immunity from prosecution,”8 and citizen
informants, who “get[] nothing but an assurance of anonymity in return
for the information provided.”9 Corporate employee-informants, also
called whistleblowers, are generally citizen informants, and perform
what is arguably an especially important role by reporting wrongdoing
that can inflict widespread harm and could otherwise be nearly
impossible to detect.10
The importance of informants in securities law enforcement is
illustrated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200211 (“SOX”) and the events
leading to its enactment. The popular press extensively reported on the
efforts of Sherron Watkins, a mid-level manager at Enron Corp., to
report suspected fraud at the company,12 and she was cited in SOX’s
legislative history.13 In turn, SOX has been described as “us[ing]
whistleblower protection as a key component of enforcement of federal
securities laws.”14 SOX mandated a variety of measures to support and
protect employees who report wrongdoing. First, it required audit
committees to “establish procedures for . . . the confidential, anonymous
submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.”15 Second, SOX enacted
severe criminal penalties – comparable to those for witness tampering16 –
for “interference with the lawful employment or livelihood” of
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Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
10
See MARLENE WINFIELD, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in
WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 21-31 (Gerald
Vinten ed., 1994).
11
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
12
See, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr. & Alex Berenson, Enron’s Collapse: The
Overview; Enron’s Chairman Received Warning about Accounting, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 2002, at A6.
13
S. Rep. No. 107-146 (2002).
14
DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE vii (2d ed. 2004).
15
SOX § 301, amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(4) (2002).
16
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2002).
9
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employees who provide information relating to a federal offense.17
Finally, SOX established a civil remedy for employees of public
companies who are the subject of retaliation. The statute18 prohibits
public companies19 and their employees and agents from
“discriminat[ing]” against an employee who provides information or
otherwise assists an investigation by federal investigators, Congress, or
the company itself into violations of (i) criminal mail, wire, bank or
securities fraud statutes,20 (ii) “any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission,” or (iii) “any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders.” Significantly, the statute also
affords the same protections to employees who “file, cause to be filed,
testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding” relating to the
same subjects.21 By its terms, this provision provides protection for
individuals who participate in or otherwise assist private securities fraud
actions.
Informants are especially valuable in private securities litigation.
Because such cases are subject to a heightened pleading standard22 and
are subject to a discovery stay until the plaintiff has overcome a motion
to dismiss,23 informants are virtually the only means of obtaining nonpublic evidence of wrongdoing at a company and are often essential for
avoiding early dismissal of an action.
B. Informants’ Need for Protection
The prevalence of retaliation against informants is widely
acknowledged. SOX is only the most recent statute to prohibit retaliation
against employees who report wrongdoing. By current count, thirty-five
other federal statutes also contain explicit provisions protecting public
17

18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002).
SOX Section 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002).
19
Companies “with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78o(d)) . . . .” Id.
20
Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 and 1348 (2002),
respectively).
21
SOX § 806(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(2) (2002).
22
See infra Part II.
23
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1) and 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2002).
18
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and/or private employees from retaliation for reporting violations of
laws, including numerous environmental statutes, laws governing other
aspects of public health and safety, laws encouraging disclosure of
public fraud and waste, and laws regulating the workplace,24 most
notably the Fair Labor Standards Act25 (“FLSA”). In addition, fortyseven states have enacted statutes protecting public sector
whistleblowers and seventeen states also provide some statutory
protection for private sector employees who report illegal conduct.26
In addition to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court has held
that the First Amendment protects public sector employees who criticize
their employers,27 and courts in many states have extended common law
protection to employees who allege retaliation in response to their efforts
to prevent or disclose unlawful practices.28
Summing up the policy underlying all of these protections in a
case under the FLSA, the Supreme Court observed that “it needs no
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to
induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept” misconduct by their
employers.29
Courts have also recognized that the chilling effect of possible
retaliation extends to former employees of a company. In Hodgson v.
Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc.,30 the Fifth Circuit
pointedly rejected the district court’s conclusion that the possibility of
retaliation against former employees in an FLSA enforcement action was
“remote and speculative.” The court noted that (i) employers “almost
invariably require prospective employees to provide the names of their
previous employers as references when applying for a job,” (ii) a former
employee “may be subjected to retaliation by his new employer if that
employer finds out that the employee has in the past” cooperated in an

24
25
26
27

Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, Appendix C.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, at 67, 77.
The leading case is Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563

(1968).

28
29
30

Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, at 132-38.
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
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enforcement action, and (iii) a former employee “may find it desirable or
necessary to seek reemployment with the defendant.”31
While SOX provides important remedies for informants faced
with retaliation, federal courts have repeatedly recognized that “the most
effective protection from retaliation is the anonymity of the informer.”32
As the Ninth Circuit has observed, informants (or informers33) are far
better served “by concealing their identities than by relying on the
deterrent effect of post hoc remedies under [a statutory] anti-retaliation
provision.”34 Other courts have consistently agreed.35
Briefly stated, many employees will step forward only if their
anonymity is assured. As a result, developing appropriate legal standards
to govern disclosure of informants’ identities is crucial to obtaining their
assistance in the detection and prosecution of corporate wrongdoing.
31

Id. Accord Martin v. New York City Transit Authority, 148 F.R.D. 56,
63 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Hodgson).
32
Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co. of West End, 326 F.2d 561, 56364 (5th Cir. 1964).
33
Courts use the terms “informer” and “informant” interchangeably. See
26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5702, at 338. For consistency, this
article uniformly uses the term “informant.”
34
Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
35
See Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368,
372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most effective means of protection, and by derivation
the most effective means of fostering citizen cooperation, is bestowing
anonymity on the informant, thus maintaining the status of the informant’s
strategic position and also encouraging others similarly situated who have not
yet offered their assistance.”) and Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633, 637 (3d Cir.
1959) (“The statutory prohibition against retaliation provides little comfort to
an employee faced with the possibility of subtle pressures by an employer,
which pressures may be so difficult to prove when seeking to enforce the
prohibition.”). Accord NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,
239-40 (1978) (“Respondent’s argument that employers will be deterred from
improper intimidation of employees who provide statements to the NLRB by
the possibility of an [anti-retaliatory] charge misses the point of Exemption
7(A); the possibility of deterrence arising from post hoc disciplinary action is
no substitute for a prophylactic rule that prevents the harm to a pending
enforcement proceeding which flows from a witness’ having been
intimidated.”).
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II. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE PLEADING STAGE
The protection of informants first arises at the start of litigation,
when the complaint is drafted. In most types of cases, there is no basis
for requiring a complaint to name confidential informants, or even to
indicate that informants were the source of the complaint’s allegations.
In securities fraud cases, however, the PSLRA requires that a complaint
“state with particularity all facts” supporting an allegation that a
statement was misleading.36 Rule 9(b), similarly, requires that “the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.”
A. Courts Agree that Informants Need Not Be Named in a Securities
Fraud Complaint
While the phrase “all facts” could be construed to require that all
sources be named and a few early district court cases so held,37 most
circuit courts have now considered the issue and all have ruled that
informants need not be identified by name. Recognizing that such a
requirement “could deter informants from providing critical information
to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them,”
the Second Circuit held in the leading case of Novak v. Kasaks38 that
“our reading of the PSLRA rejects any notion that confidential sources
must be named as a general matter.”39 Novak’s approach has been
endorsed by the First,40 Third,41 Fifth,42 Seventh,43 Eighth,44 Ninth45 and
36

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2002).
See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 764 (N.D.
Cal. 1997); In re Nice Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2001).
38
216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
39
Id. at 313.
40
In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F3d 11, 28-30 (1st Cir. 2002).
41
Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146-47
(3d Cir. 2004).
42
ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351-52 (5th
Cir. 2002).
43
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 2006)
44
Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645,
667-68 (8th Cir. 2001).
45
In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005).
37
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Tenth46 Circuits. In four of these decisions, the circuit courts also
specifically endorsed the Second Circuit’s concern that naming
informants could have a chilling effect.47 The Seventh Circuit, for
example, observed that “[a] bright line rule obligating the plaintiffs to
reveal their sources has the potential to deter informants from exposing
malfeasance. Such a rule might also invite retaliation.”48
B. Courts Disagree About How Informants Should Be Identified
While courts now uniformly agree that confidential informants
need not be identified by name in a complaint, the circuit courts do not
agree on the type of identifying material that must be supplied. In Novak,
the Second Circuit required that confidential sources be “described in the
complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a
person in the position occupied by the source would possess the
information alleged.”49 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have adopted this
formulation.50 The First Circuit, by contrast, calls for “evaluation, inter
alia, of the level of detail provided by the confidential sources, the
corroborative nature of the other facts alleged (including from other
sources), the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of
sources, the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.”51 The Third
Circuit has adopted substantially the same criteria as the First Circuit,52
and the Ninth Circuit has also approved use of the First Circuit’s criteria
to “augment[]” the Second Circuit’s approach in Novak.53 The Tenth
Circuit has adopted the loosest standard, rejecting a “per se rule that a
plaintiff’s complaint must always identify the source” in any manner.54
Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, source information is more
46

Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003).
In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002); Cal. Pub.
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004);
Tchuruk, 291 F.3d at 352-53; Makor, 437 F.3d at 596.
48
Makor, 437 F.3d at 596.
49
216 F.3d at 314.
50
Makor, 437 F.3d at 596 (quoting Novak); Tchuruk, 291 F.3d at 353
(adopting a substantially identical formulation).
51
Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 29-30.
52
Chubb, 394 F.3d at 147.
53
Daou, 411 F.3d at 1015.
54
Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1101.
47
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important for allegations that “are difficult to verify, such as allegations
of secret meetings, the contents of private conversations, or alleged
motivations,” than for allegations that “may be objectively verifiable,”
such as “specific contract terms, the financial result of a transaction, or
specific prevailing market conditions.”55
The manner in which informants are identified is important.
Practice teaches that defendants often devote significant effort to
ferreting out informants and are frequently successful in their efforts.
Executive suites – where most actionable frauds are perpetrated – are
small enough at most public companies that a job title or description of
responsibilities will be the equivalent, for the insiders who matter, of
naming the witness. At the same time, identifying an informant by job
title or responsibilities poorly serves defendants’ interest in protection
against meritless claims. As one court has noted, job titles convey little
about actual job duties,56 and formal job duties often say little about
whether an employee would have been privy to senior-level
communications evidencing actionable misconduct.
Of greater relevance than an employee’s job title or duties is an
explanation of how the employee came to have the information pleaded.
Junior employees in unlikely positions can provide credible (albeit
hearsay) evidence of wrongdoing through friendship with a strategicallyplaced coworker. At the same time, a well-placed senior executive might
have come to particular knowledge through unreliable office gossip, to
which a court ought assign little weight.
The better approach is therefore to require specificity as to how
the source came to possess the information pleaded, such as that the
witness had direct access to relevant communications as a part of her job
responsibilities or that the witness learned of the relevant facts through a
close relationship with a co-worker who was directed to execute a part of
the scheme.
This analysis is consistent with each of the appeals courts’
formulations cited supra. It fits well with the “totality of the
circumstances” approaches of the First, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
and also conforms to the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ approach
55

Id.
In re Northpoint Commc’ns Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 221 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

56
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(applying the light gloss of reading “position” in the sense of “situation”
as opposed to “post of employment”57).
C. In Camera Review of Witness Interview Notes Serves the Interests of
Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Court
Whatever test is applied, determining the appropriate level of
detail to use in describing informants remains a challenge for plaintiffs.
The degree of particularity required to survive a motion to dismiss varies
from judge to judge, based both on individual assessments of what
“particularity” means and, inevitably, on the judge’s perception of the
merits of the case. A plaintiff who provides too much detail risks
“outing” its informants; a plaintiff who provides too little risks dismissal
of the cause. The same drafting problem applies to supporting
documentation, such as an incriminating email that reflects which
recipient’s copy has been printed.
One remedy is for plaintiffs to proffer witness statements and
supporting documentation for in camera review. In camera inspection of
materials is, of course, “well established in the federal courts”58 in
connection with claims of privilege, and has been strongly endorsed by
the Supreme Court in that context.59
Although supplementing a complaint with materials supplied in
camera and ex parte is rare at best,60 this fact is unsurprising given the
norm of simple notice pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and the recent
vintage of widespread use of informants in private litigation. While
“‘[o]ur adversarial legal system generally does not tolerate ex parte
determinations on the merits of a civil case,’”61 similar concerns are not
57

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1413 (3d ed. 1996).
58
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569 (1989).
59
Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976) (“this Court has
long held the view that in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful
means of dealing with” certain claims of privilege). See also Zolin, 491 U.S. at
568-69 (“this Court has approved the practice of requiring parties who seek to
avoid disclosure of documents to make the documents available for in camera
inspection”).
60
Our research, in fact, found no reported examples.
61
Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996) (summary
judgment motion, quoting Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th
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implicated at the pleading stage. In addition, criminal law provides a
clear precedent for use of ex parte materials supplied in camera to make
a threshold showing of merit at the commencement of a case: such
materials are routinely submitted to support the filing of a criminal
complaint and issuance of an arrest warrant pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.62 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a),
an arrest warrant will issue upon “probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .”
The issuing judge, in turn, determines “probable cause” by considering
the “totality-of-the-circumstances,” that is, “all the circumstances set
forth in the [complaint or] affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’
and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information . . .
.”63 This determination is ordinarily made on an ex parte basis, and
indeed often relies heavily on information supplied by anonymous
informants.64
The similarity of ex parte probable cause determinations in
criminal cases to the court’s task in evaluating the sufficiency of a
securities fraud complaint was noted by the First Circuit in its decision
approving the use of anonymous informants in securities cases.65 The

Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)). Apparently
the sole exception, noted in Vining, is when “the submissions involve
compelling national security concerns or the statute granting the cause of action
specifically provides for in camera resolution of the dispute.” 99 F.3d at 1057.
62
The criminal precedent should a fortiori defeat any due process
concerns, since “the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant may be viewed
as ‘qualitatively more significant’ than the outcome of civil litigation.” Holman
v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1989).
63
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238 (1983). See also United States
v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (evaluating “probable cause” for
an arrest).
64
See generally, Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (discussing when use of informants’
testimony is permissible); 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5714
(discussing when a criminal defendant is entitled to obtain disclosure of the
identity of confidential informants whose statements had been used to establish
probable cause to search or arrest).
65
In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).

12

court described probable cause determinations as a “helpful analogy” to
evaluating the sufficiency of complaints subject to the PSLRA.66
In camera review also serves judicial efficiency. The challenges
of drafting a legally sufficient securities fraud complaint were fairly
described by the Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,
Inc.:67 “But how much detail is enough detail? When is an inference of
deliberate recklessness sufficiently strong? There is no bright-line rule.
Sometimes it is easy to tell, but often it is not. . . . In this technical and
demanding corner of the law, the drafting of a cognizable complaint can
be a matter of trial and error.”68
The Ninth Circuit cited these challenges as support for its holding
that plaintiffs should be liberally granted leave to replead in securities
fraud cases. No party, however, benefits from drafting and briefing
seriatim amended complaints and motions to dismiss. By allowing
plaintiffs to present all their supporting materials, in camera review
reduces the need for trial-and-error pleading and lets the court evaluate
the sufficiency of a complaint taking into account all support that the
plaintiff has adduced for its allegations.
Finally, the statutory purposes underlying the PSLRA and Rule
9(b) support use of the in camera device. The PSLRA required detailed
pleading “to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits.”69 Rule 9(b) similarly
“gives defendants notice of the claims against them, provides an
increased measure of protection for their reputations, and reduces the
number of frivolous suits brought solely to extract settlements.”70 At the
same time, Congress, in enacting the PSLRA, characterized private
securities litigation as “an indispensable tool” for injured investors,71 and
courts have cautioned that they “should be sensitive to the fact that
66

Id. at 30.
316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).
68
Id. at 1052.
69
H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
70
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir.
1997) (Alito, J.).
71
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
Conference Report on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
67

13

application of [Rule 9(b)] prior to discovery may permit sophisticated
defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their fraud.”72 As these
statements indicate, the PSLRA seeks a balance that excludes
unmeritorious cases while allowing valid claims to proceed. As the
Supreme Court held in evaluating claims of privilege, “it would seem
that an in camera review . . . is a relatively costless and eminently
worthwhile method to insure that the balance . . . is correctly struck.”73
III. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE TRIAL AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STAGE
Due process mandates a simple rule for disclosure of informants’
identities at trial and for summary judgment: absent “acute national
security concerns,”74 anonymous testimony is never allowed and
informants’ identities must therefore always be disclosed.75

72

Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1418 (internal quotations
omitted). See also 2 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
9.03[1][b] (3d ed. 2006).
73
Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976).
74
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (also
observing “[i]t s a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party
access to the evidence tendered in support of a requested court judgment. The
openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the
reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States courts. It is therefore the
firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the
basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.”).
75
See Reich v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 58,
62 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The informer’s privilege does not override the
government’s duty to disclose the identity of witnesses who will testify at
trial.”); Hansberry v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, No. CV-03-3006 (CPS),
2004 WL 3152393, at *4 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2004) (declining in camera
review of affidavit proffered on a summary judgment motion); Wirtz v.
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1964) (requiring
disclosure of all witnesses, including confidential informants, shortly before
trial). Although few decisions squarely address this issue, commentators,
recognizing the fundamental due process dimension of the issue, describe it as a
firm rule. See 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5710, at 404-05 (“the
government cannot assert the privilege to refuse to disclose the witnesses it will
call at trial”); 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
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Whether a witness’ status as an informant need be revealed is less
clear. One commentator suggests it does, stating that “the fact that he is
an informer must of course be disclosed as a significant aspect of his
credibility,”76 while the Fifth Circuit, when confronted with the issue in
an FLSA case, held that the informants did not need to be identified as
such when lists of trial witnesses were exchanged.77
The proper rule should probably depend on the type of informant.
If an informant receives a tangible benefit, such as money or immunity
from prosecution, that information clearly goes to the informant’s
credibility. No similar justification, however, supports identification of a
citizen informant who receives nothing but an assurance of anonymity.
IV. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE DISCOVERY STAGE
Discovery poses the hardest issues in balancing the competing
interests in preserving informants’ anonymity and compelling their
disclosure. Absent a “lucky guess” by the defendant, withholding an
informant’s identity necessarily denies the defendant the chance to
depose the informant, a result contrary to both the “broad and liberal”
discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,78 and
the principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”79
When evaluating whether a confidential witness must be
identified during discovery, it is important to note what is at stake and
what is not. Because “[t]rial by surprise is no longer countenanced,”80

510:1 (6th ed. 2006) (“If the government calls the informer at trial, the witness’
identity . . . must of course be disclosed”).
76
Graham, supra note 75, § 510:1.
77
Wirtz v. Robinson & Stephens, Inc., 368 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1966).
78
Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999).
79
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
80
Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir.
2006). See also Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir.
1988) (purpose of liberal discovery is to “‘make a trial less a game of blind
man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to
the fullest practicable extent’” (quoting United States v. Proctor and Gamble &
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958))).
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informants who a party intends to call at trial must be identified in
response to a proper interrogatory during discovery.
Whether the identity of confidential informants can be learned
through discovery therefore concerns a limited group of individuals:
those who provided confidential information to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s
counsel, but who will not later be called as witnesses at trial. While
limited, protection of this group of informants is crucial. As noted
supra,81 non-testifying informants are the principal source of non-public
information that plaintiffs can rely on to meet the heightened pleading
standards under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA. In addition, informants often
become willing to testify at trial only after they have developed a rapport
with counsel and see that their testimony could contribute to successful
prosecution of the lawsuit. Thus, even in the case of witnesses who later
agree to testify, plaintiffs are far more likely to persuade a witness to
have an initial conversation if they can represent that the conversation is
likely to be protected (or, better yet, is the subject of a protective order,
as discussed infra82).
Disclosure of confidential witnesses in discovery has been the
subject of reported decisions in a number of securities cases. Until Judge
Michael Baylson’s decision earlier this year in In re Cigna Corp.
Securities Litigation,83 however, these cases evaluated protection of
informants only on the basis of the attorney work product doctrine.84
While the public interest in confidentiality for informants was discussed
in some decisions, this interest was evaluated only in the context of
determining whether the identity of such witnesses constituted protected
attorney work product.85
81

See Part I.A.
See Part IV.F.
83
No. Civ. A. 02-8088, 2006 WL 263631 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006).
84
See cases discussed in Part IV.A. infra.
85
In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, SACV 00-0745 DOC,
2002 WL 32344347, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002); In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 389 (S.D. Cal. 2002); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999);
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C0120418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005); Miller v. Ventro
Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2004).
82
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Outside the securities context, however, several courts have
focused directly on the public policy and privacy interests at stake. Their
approach is consistent with the substantial bodies of caselaw that
construe the government informant’s privilege and evaluate the need for
disclosure of the identities of other types of witnesses in situations where
public policy or privacy concerns militate against the general policy of
full disclosure.
A. Attorney Work Product as a Basis for Protection
Securities cases addressing protection of confidential informants
on the basis of attorney work product split on whether informants’
identities must be disclosed.
The justification for protecting informant identities as attorney
work product was best articulated in In re MTI Technologies Corp.
Securities Litigation II.86 The court noted that the work product doctrine
generally protects trial preparation materials, and explained that “if the
identity of interviewed witnesses is disclosed, opposing counsel can infer
which witnesses counsel considers important, revealing mental
impressions and trial strategy.”87
While the MTI decision has persuaded one sister California
district court,88 attorney work product has not carried the day elsewhere.
In In re Aetna Inc. Securities Litigation,89 Judge Padova of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rejected a claim of work product protection for
informants’ names, on the grounds that such information either was not
work product at all, or, in the alternative “at most has minimal work
product content [and] the need for the information sought outweighs the
minimal work product content that such information may have.”90 Judge
Padova’s analysis has persuaded three other district courts in published
opinions.91
86

MTI, 2002 WL 32344347.
Id. at *3.
88
Ashworth, 213 F.R.D. 385.
89
1999 WL 354527.
90
Id. at *2.
91
In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ga. 2002);
Miller v. Ventro Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 21, 2004); and Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v.
87
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Plaintiffs’ lack of success in invoking the work product doctrine
is unsurprising considering the doctrine is premised on the principle that
“it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy”92 and,
by the express language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), protects only
“mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.”93 In this
framework, there is simply no basis for according weight to the public
policy in favor of detecting corporate wrongdoing or to informants’
privacy interests.
In the cases cited supra, the courts have attempted to distinguish
decisions reaching the opposite result by pointing to the number of
individuals “likely to have discoverable information”94 who were named
by the plaintiffs in initial disclosures or in response to interrogatories. In
Aetna, for example, the court noted that the plaintiffs had named roughly
750 individuals and observed that “[w]ithout the Court’s intervention,
Defendants would be forced to engage in a time-consuming and
expensive effort to ferret out the veritable needle in the haystack.”95 In
MTI, the court observed that the plaintiffs had listed only seventy-one
current and former employees, “not even close to the unmanageable
number present in Aetna.”96 Other courts have held 1,200 and “at least
165” names to be too many,97 but “approximately 100” to be
reasonable.98 These attempts to draw a line of demarcation between a
witness list that hides the ball to an acceptable degree, and one that hides
the ball too well, are ill-advised. Requiring plaintiffs to name
confidential informants, but conceal them among other persons with
knowledge results in an unhappy compromise that forces defendants to
depose third parties who may only be tangentially involved. Depending
on the stakes of the litigation and the defendant’s resources, the cost of
Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555 (N.D. Cal. June 21,
2005).
92
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
93
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
94
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
95
1999 WL 354527, at *4.
96
In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, SACV 00-0745 DOC,
2002 WL 32344347, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002).
97
Cisco, 2005 WL 1459555, at *5; Miller, 2004 WL 868202, at *1-2.
98
In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 390 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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deposing all witnesses may be prohibitive and therefore constitute a de
facto denial of access to the informants. At the same time, hiding
informants among other witnesses may not provide informants with
adequate protection. Depending on how plaintiffs derive their list of
persons with knowledge, even a list of 1,000 names may not effectively
camouflage a senior informant or one with specialized knowledge or job
duties.
The better approach, set forth infra, is therefore to develop
principled rules for when informants must be named, and when their
names may be withheld altogether. Securities plaintiffs’ focus on
attorney work product simply neglects the established framework for
recognizing the public policy interests at stake – concerns that have been
specifically acknowledged, as noted supra,99 by a majority of the circuit
courts that have considered pleading-stage disclosure of informants in
PSLRA cases. Outside of the securities context, courts have readily
acknowledged these interests when asked to shield the identities of
informants and other individuals, as discussed in Part IV.D., infra.
B. The Informant’s Privilege as Precedent for Protection of Private
Informants
Although not addressed by any of the district court decisions
discussed in Part IV.A., supra, the identities of confidential government
informants have been protected since at least the nineteenth century.100
The Supreme Court first recognized the “informant’s privilege” in its
current form in 1957, holding in Roviaro v. United States101 that
informants’ identities were generally not subject to discovery to further
“the public interest in effective law enforcement.”102 The Court
explained that “[t]he privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to lawenforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.”103 While described as the “informant’s
(or informer’s) privilege,” the Court in Roviaro explained that it “is in
99
100
101
102
103

See Part II.A.
See 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5702, at 340-41.
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
Id. at 59.
Id.
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reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law.”104 Consistent with its
purpose and function, the informant’s privilege is applicable to
government informants in civil cases, as well as in criminal
prosecutions.105
Under Roviaro, the privilege is qualified, and when an
informant’s identity “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused,
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way.”106 In a criminal case, this standard “calls for balancing the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s
right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders
nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of
each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other
relevant factors.”107
Unlike most other privileges, such as attorney-client or
psychotherapist-patient, which broadly protect the contents of
communications, the informant’s privilege protects only the identity of
the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they “tend to
reveal the identity of” an informant.108 Thus, witness statements and
similar materials are discoverable – subject to redaction to remove

104

Id.
See Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d 282,
283 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although Roviaro was a criminal case, the privilege
uniformly has been applied in civil cases as well.”). A compilation of civil
cases can be found in Thomas J. Oliver, Annotation, Application, in Federal
Civil Action, of Governmental Privilege of Nondisclosure of Identity of
Informer, 8 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1971).
106
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61.
107
Id. at 62.
108
Id. at 60 (“The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying
purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will
not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged.”).
See also United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Roviaro for this proposition).
105
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identifying information, and subject to any other applicable privileges
and limitations on disclosure.109
A substantial body of criminal and civil caselaw following
Roviaro has fully developed the parameters of the privilege. First,
consistent with the due process principles noted supra, the identity of an
informant who appears as a witness at trial must virtually always be
disclosed.110 When an informant is not called to testify, cases following
Roviaro focus principally on the relationship of the informant to the
crime charged or wrongdoing alleged. Ordinarily, disclosure is required
in criminal cases if the informant is the only participant other than the
accused, or is the only witness able to confirm or refute the testimony of
government witnesses.111 Disclosure is generally not required when the
informant is a “mere tipster,” even if also a witness to the crime.112 In
cases that fall between these extremes, courts resort to balancing, as
prescribed in Roviaro.113
In civil litigation, claims of privilege arise most often in wage
and hour cases under the FLSA.114 As in the criminal context, the
requesting party can override the privilege by showing that its need for
disclosure outweighs the government’s interest in confidentiality. This
need is evaluated both by assessing the relationship between the
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Disclosure of witness interview notes is discussed infra at notes 178184 and in the accompanying text.
110
See notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
111
See United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1991);
Suarez v. United States, 582 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring
disclosure if the informant “played an active and crucial role”). See generally
Graham, supra note 75, § 510:1 and 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7,
§ 5713, at 434-37.
112
Martinez, 922 F.2d at 921; Suarez, 582 F.2d at 1011.
113
Suarez, 582 F.2d at 1011; United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421 (9th
Cir. 1995) (Roviaro balancing is based on “(1) the degree to which the
informant was involved in the criminal activity; (2) how helpful the informant’s
testimony would be to the defendant; (3) the government’s interest in nondisclosure”); 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5713, at 438-39.
114
See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2019, at 301 n.11 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting
cases), and the numerous FLSA cases cited in this article.
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informant and the wrong alleged, as in criminal cases,115 and also by
directly evaluating the relevancy of the identity of the informant to the
facts at issue in the case.116
C. Extension of the Informant’s Privilege to Private Informants
The clear and well-defined nature of the informant’s privilege
invites extension from government informants to those who assist private
plaintiffs, at least plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general.” While
opponents of private enforcement actions argue that they lead to
excessive litigation, interfere with public enforcement, and lack
accountability,117 these opponents do not question the significant
deterrent effect of private litigation, and none of the arguments against
private enforcement supports depriving plaintiffs of a tool that is
essential to their ability to detect and gather proof of serious wrongdoing.
Indeed, the asserted deficiencies of private actions may be ameliorated
by enhancing plaintiffs’ information-gathering tools.
In addition, in the case of private securities fraud actions, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the important role of private
enforcement actions,118 and Congress, even while imposing limits on
private actions in the PSLRA, stated in its legislative history that
115

See Suarez, 582 F.2d at 10012 (refusing disclosure of an informant in a
civil tax enforcement case, noting that he was merely a “marginal observer of
the activities” of the taxpayers); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir.
1989) (refusing disclosure in a § 1983 action alleging a wrongful shooting by
an arresting officer where “[t]here was no indication that the informant was an
active participant in the burglary or a witness to it”);
116
Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964) (“It
is perfectly plain that the names of informers are utterly irrelevant to the issues
to be tried by the trial court.”). Accord Usery v. Ritter, 547 F.2d 528, 531 (10th
Cir. 1977) and Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d
282, 284 (5th Cir. 1987).
117
The literature is summarized in Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114-20 (2005).
118
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310
(1985) (“we repeatedly have emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a
most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a
necessary supplement to Commission action.’” (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))).
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“[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon
government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others
properly perform their jobs.”119
Decisions applying the current version of the privilege in civil
cases further illustrate why extending the informant’s privilege is
appropriate. Several of these courts have reasoned that “[s]ince the guilt
or innocence of a criminal defendant may be viewed as ‘qualitatively
more significant’ than the outcome of civil litigation,” the privilege
should actually be stronger and yield less frequently in the civil
context.120
While informants in civil litigation are less likely to face threat to
life and limb, courts have recognized that the informant’s privilege
“[a]lso recognizes the subtler forms of retaliation such as blacklisting,
economic duress and social ostracism.”121
The fact that corporate misconduct – particularly, fraud and
antitrust offenses – regularly gives rise to parallel criminal prosecutions
and (private) civil cases further supports extension of the privilege and
119

Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
Conference Report on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
120
Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Dole v.
Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In
civil cases the privilege, which limits the right of disclosure usually called for
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is arguably greater since not all
constitutional guarantees which inure to criminal defendants are similarly
available to civil defendants.” (citations omitted)); Management Information
Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 151 F.R.D. 478, 483 n.2
(D.D.C. 1993) (“[i]t would seem rather incongruous for courts to decline to turn
over such information in proceedings where a defendant’s liberty is at stake
while providing such materials in a civil setting where monetary damages alone
are involved”); Matter of Search of 1638 E. 2nd Street, Tulsa, Okl., 993 F.2d
773, 775 (10th Cir. 1993) (in civil cases, “the informer’s privilege is arguably
stronger, because the constitutional guarantees assured to criminal defendants
are inapplicable”).
121
Dole, 870 F.2d at 372.
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demonstrates the lack of any good justification for applying different
rules to governmental and non-governmental informants. It would be
perverse indeed to hold that an indicted corporate officer facing years in
prison and the loss of her reputation was barred by the privilege from
obtaining the identities of informants located by prosecutors while her
former employer, facing the loss of a few basis points of quarterly
earnings in a class action, was entitled to broader discovery of the names
of informants located by plaintiffs’ counsel.
While these considerations underscore the appropriateness of
protecting non-governmental informants in private litigation, the
Supreme Court’s privileges jurisprudence effectively forecloses formal
expansion of the informant’s privilege as the means to do so.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the
federal law of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.” The Supreme Court has
recognized that this provision “authorizes federal courts to define new
privileges.”122 However, the Court has repeatedly confirmed that “the
public has a right to every man’s evidence”123 and that “there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any
exceptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule.”124 Accordingly, the Court has
held that evidentiary privileges “are not lightly created nor expansively
construed,”125 and has declined most invitations to create or expand
privileges.126
122

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)
(quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)) (internal
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
124
Id. (same parenthetical notes)
125
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting academic
peer review privilege); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (rejecting
privilege for “legislative acts”); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989)
(rejecting claim that in camera review of materials to determine applicability of
crime-fraud exception would impair attorney-client privilege); Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that voluntary testimony by spouse
was not barred by spousal privilege).
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Under the leading Supreme Court case addressing the creation of
new privileges, Jaffee v. Redmond, the common law analysis begins with
an evaluation of the interests supporting the privilege.127 While the
interests in insuring the free flow of information from informants are
manifest, they are mitigated by another factor cited later in Jaffee – the
need for certainty and predictability in application of the evidentiary
privilege. For many privileges, such as the psychotherapist-patient
privilege at issue in Jaffee or the spousal privilege recognized in
Hawkins v. United States,128 the protected communications typically
occur before litigation has commenced, and potentially before it is even
anticipated. Accordingly, the interests at stake call for a clear rule to
guide members of the public in their conduct. By contrast, contacts with
informants occur in conjunction with litigation. As a result, the relevant
facts can be presented to the presiding judge for a case-by-case
determination with little harm to the relevant interests.
The other principal factor discussed in Jaffee was the consensus
among the states.129 Because no state apparently recognizes an
informant’s privilege for non-governmental informants, this factor
weighs significantly against the recognition of an expanded privilege.
The same is true of a third factor discussed in Jaffee – whether the
privilege was included among those proposed by the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence in 1969.130 The Advisory Committee
made no provision for protection of non-governmental informants.131
While Supreme Court precedents therefore do not support
expanding the informant’s privilege, other decisions by circuit and
district courts around the country reflect consistent use of a case-by-case,
balancing approach to achieve a similar result.
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518 U.S. at 11.
358 U.S. 74 (1958).
129
518 U.S. at 12-13.
130
Id. at 14-15 (citing inclusion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
among the Advisory Committee’s proposed rules).
131
Proposed Rule 510, rejected by Congress, would have codified the
common law informant’s privilege, but was limited to governmental
informants. See Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 255 (1972).
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D. Balancing the Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure
All of the factors mentioned supra: the value of confidential
informants in enforcement actions, informants’ need for protection, the
important role of private litigation, and the lack of justification for
different standards of protection in government and private actions,
argue in favor of protecting the identities of private confidential
informants. In the absence of formal privilege, the few courts faced with
demands for the disclosure of confidential witnesses outside the
securities arena have provided this protection through a balancing
analysis. Many other courts have adopted the same approach in other
situations where public policy and privacy interests support the
protection of witnesses’ identities. As a number of these cases illustrate,
balancing is often adopted by courts in lieu of creation of a new
privilege.132
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E.g., Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir.
2005) (rejecting privilege for private informant but remanding so that the trial
court could perform a balancing analysis); Northwestern Memorial Hospital v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (rejecting privilege
for abortion records but quashing subpoena under balancing analysis); In re
Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting
that “even where an evidentiary privilege is not available, a party may petition
the court for a protective order” and remanding for a determination of whether
such an order was proper); Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting scholarly journal peer review privilege but
protecting identity of peer reviewer under balancing analysis), aff’d, 870 F.2d
642 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288 n.4
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting medical peer review privilege but noting that an order
protecting the identities of third parties would be proper); Seales v. Macomb
Co., 226 F.R.D. 572, 578-79 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (rejecting juvenile records
privilege but redacting identifying information based on balancing analysis);
Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that no private
investigatory privilege existed but protecting investigatory records based on
balancing analysis).
Such balancing differs significantly from the recognition of a new
privilege because, under Rule 26(c), the party seeking protection bears the
burden of persuasion, see infra footnote 161 and accompanying text. By
contrast, in the case of the informant’s privilege, as with others, “the
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The First Circuit’s decision last year in Gill v. Gulfstream Park
Racing Ass’n, Inc.133 reflects the proper approach. In Gill, a racehorse
owner sued a racetrack operator for defamation in connection with a
private investigation into wrongdoing by the owner. The plaintiff
subpoenaed documents from a (non-party) trade association that had
initiated the investigation. The trade association opposed the subpoena
on the grounds that the documents contained the names of confidential
informants. The district court held the informant’s privilege inapplicable,
and declined to protect the identities of the informants.134 The First
Circuit vacated and remanded. It agreed that the applicable state-law
informant’s privilege did not apply, but held that the “‘[t]he “good
cause” standard in [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)] is a flexible one that requires
an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be present in
a particular case.’”135 Under Rule 26(c), “[i]n particular, considerations
of the public interest, the need for confidentiality, and privacy interests
are relevant factors to be balanced.”136 By failing to recognize and
evaluate these interests, the First Circuit held that the district court had
abused its discretion.137
A similar approach was adopted by Judge Sporkin in
Management Information Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co.138 There, the defendant sought discovery of sources who had
allegedly provided the plaintiff with confidential company documents.
Judge Sporkin discussed at length the risk of retaliation to which
whistleblowers are exposed, and declined to order disclosure of the
sources.139 He described his ruling as “based on the Court’s balancing of
the interest of third parties with the needs of the defendants to defend
themselves in the present proceeding” and noted that the “identities of
government is granted the privilege as of right.” Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989).
133
399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir. 2005).
134
Id. at 393-94.
135
Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952,
959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
136
Id.
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139
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the confidential informants . . . are at best marginally relevant to the
issues at stake in this litigation.”140
In In re Cigna Corp. Securities Litigation,141 a securities case,
Judge Baylson focused directly on the value of and need to protect
confidential informants, and held that while defendants were entitled to a
list of all “persons with relevant knowledge,” including all informants,
plaintiffs were not required to specifically identify their informants from
among the universe of all persons with knowledge.142
Numerous other courts faced with discovery requests for witness
identities have performed similar balancing of public policy and privacy
interests against defendants’ need for disclosure. Recognizing the
chilling effect of disclosure of witnesses’ identities on socially-valuable
speech, courts have protected (i) the identities of doctors who reported
wrongdoing by a pharmaceutical company sales representative to his
employer, based on a concern that the representative might “seek reprisal
against them if he learned their identities;”143 (ii) the identity of a referee
who evaluated a manuscript for a peer reviewed scholarly journal, based
on the societal value of the peer review process,144 (iii) the identities of
judges and attorneys who provided adverse comments to a screening
committee evaluating the performance of an attorney retained to provide
services to indigent criminal defendants, based on the “important societal
interest” of an effective evaluation process and chilling effect of
disclosures;145 (iv) the identity of a person who reported suspected child
abuse, based on the societal value of such disclosures and the chilling
effect of revealing the identity of reporters;146 (v) the identities of doctors
and hospitals who reported adverse reactions to drugs under a voluntary
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reporting system operated by the Food and Drug Administration;147 the
(vi) identities of doctors and patients involved in medical peer reviews
arising from incidents of possible medical error;148 and (vii) the identities
of academic tenure committee members and evaluators.149
Courts have also recognized the privacy interests affected by
disclosure – interests possessed by confidential informants, as
recognized in Gill150 – and protected individuals’ identities from
disclosure in a range of situations. Based on privacy concerns, courts
have protected (i) abortion records identifying patients in litigation with
the Department of Justice over the constitutionality of anti-abortion
legislation;151 (ii) the identity of residents in a group home for juveniles
in a civil rights action arising out of improper conduct by employees at
the home;152 and (iii) the names of patients in a nursing home in a suit
alleging overcharging for medications.153
Citing both public interests and privacy rights, courts have also
protected the identities of participants in a study sponsored by the Center
for Disease Control in a products liability action,154 and the names of
members of a private medical society in an action alleging
anticompetitive conduct by the society.155
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Protection of private confidential informants also finds support in
cases shielding investigatory materials of private industry trade groups
that perform a regulatory function. In Ross v. Bolton,156 the court
recognized that the public interest in effective industry regulation by the
National Association of Securities Dealers warranted protection for its
investigative files.157 Similar interests have been recognized, and similar
protections afforded for investigative files of the New York Mercantile
Exchange158 and the New York City Board of Trade.159
One obvious precedent for protecting the identities of private
informants – the reporter’s privilege – in fact provides little guidance
because the current status of the privilege is unsettled.160
E. Balancing as Applied to Confidential Informants
To obtain a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), the moving
party “‘has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of
that order.’”161 To meet this burden, a plaintiff seeking protection for its
confidential informants is obligated to establish a threshold need for
156
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protection. This should ordinarily take the form of an affidavit from an
investigator averring that one or more persons (i) have informed the
investigator that they have information concerning suspected
wrongdoing by the defendant, (ii) are unwilling to provide such
information due to a fear of retaliation or other injury if their identity is
disclosed, and (iii) would be willing to provide such information if
assured that their identity would be shielded from disclosure.
As discussed supra,162 Rule 26(c) requires the trial court to
“undertake ‘an individualized balancing of the many interests that may
be present in a particular case.’”163 In performing this balancing,
“[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or
articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.”164
In the case of confidential informants, the public’s interest in
disclosure of wrongdoing, together with the witness’ privacy interests,
must be balanced against the defendant’s need to defend the action.
When balancing these interests, it is important to recognize that the harm
to be avoided through the order is the danger that potential witnesses will
refuse to come forward – i.e., the chilling effect of the fear of possible
retaliation or harm to reputation, and not the threat of actual retaliation or
other injury to the witnesses themselves. Even if a witness’ fear of
adverse consequences is unfounded, such fear can nonetheless silence
the witness and prevent disclosure of the wrongdoing. Accordingly, the
absence of credible evidence of a threat should not impede issuance of a
protective order based on a potential witness’ bona fide concerns, as
presented to the court in an investigator’s affidavit. Focus on chilling
effect, rather than the actual risk of harm, is consistent with the balancing
162
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cases cited supra, none of which attempted to evaluate whether the fear
of harm was well-founded.165 The “difficulty of such proof”166 further
supports this view.
After the plaintiff has carried the initial burden of demonstrating
a need for protection, the analysis performed under Roviaro provides
well-developed guidance for balancing this interest against both the
defendant’s interest in effectively opposing the claim and the judicial
system’s policy in favor of liberal discovery.167 Under Roviaro, as
discussed supra,168 courts look to the role of the informant, and an
informant who played an active role in the wrongdoing is far more likely
to be exposed than one who was a “mere tipster.”169 In civil cases
involving corporate wrongdoing, courts also directly evaluate the
relevancy of the information possessed by the informant to the facts at
issue in the case.170
Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit refused to disclose the
identity of an informant in Brock v. On Shore Quality Control
Specialists, Inc.,171 a case brought under the FLSA. The court observed
that “[t]he issue to be tried in this case concerns the nature of the duties
performed by these individuals, and whether the duties are, as claimed,
administrative. The list of ‘all persons who have given information to the
Department of Labor’ is ‘utterly irrelevant to the issues to be tried by the
trial court.’”172 Similarly, in Usery v. Ritter,173 the Tenth Circuit refused
disclosure in another FLSA case, noting that “[t]he record contains no
showing by defendants of their need, or the reasons for their need, of the
disclosure of the identity of the informants. The defendants know the job
classifications, the pay rolls, and the type of work done by each
165
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employee. The government has specified individuals, classifications, and
types of machines which it deems pertinent to its case.”174
In many cases, private informants are similarly situated to the
government informants in Ritter and On Shore Quality Control. They
have learned of wrongdoing either because they were personally directed
to undertake improper actions or because they were informed of
improprieties by fellow employees. As in the FLSA cases cited, the truth
is within the knowledge of the defendants, and there is little legitimate
need to obtain discovery from the informant. There may be situations
where an informant played an active role in wrongdoing or had
conversations with senior managers who are no longer available. In these
situations, disclosure of the informant’s identity may well be required,
but these instances will be the exception.
Thus, in most cases, a balancing analysis under Rule 26(c) will
support shielding the identities of confidential informants from
disclosure.
F. Practice Issues in Protecting Informants’ Identities
While protection of informants has often been litigated in the
context of a Rule 37(a) motion to compel,175 seeking a protective order
under Rule 26(c) or moving to quash or modify a subpoena pursuant to
Rule 45(c)(3)176 provides benefits to plaintiffs beyond the usual postural
advantages. First, a Rule 26(c) motion offers the opportunity to bring the
importance of informants to the court’s attention early in a case and
provides the occasion to allow witness statements to be tendered for in
camera review in advance of a ruling on a motion to dismiss. Second, a
protective order significantly enhances the ability of plaintiffs’
investigators to give comfort to potential informants regarding their risk
of exposure. It also sets the “ground rules” for initial disclosures under
Rule 26(a) and later discovery proceedings.
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A protective order should provide that the plaintiff may withhold
the identity of a witness in discovery if the witness requests anonymity,
provided that the plaintiff discloses the existence of the witness to the
defendant and reasonably identifies (i) the subject matter of the
information provided, and (ii) how the source came to possess the
information provided.
Because a defendant may chose to depose a non-party who has
served as a confidential informant even if the informant has not been
identified by the plaintiff, the order should also bar the defendant’s
counsel from inquiring in depositions whether a witness had voluntarily
initiated contact with the plaintiff or provided information to the plaintiff
or its investigators.
Insuring the flow of information from informants may also
require an order that confidentiality agreements between the defendant
and former employees do not bar the employees from providing
information concerning the misconduct at issue, or that such agreements,
to the extent they purport to bar communications concerning alleged
wrongdoing, are void as against public policy.177 A detailed discussion of
when such orders are appropriate is beyond the scope of this article.
G. Protection for Witness Interview Notes
As discussed supra, the informant’s privilege extends only to the
identity of the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they
tend to reveal the identity of an informant.178 Given the similarity of the
policies underlying the balancing analysis discussed supra, the
protection afforded by balancing should not extend further.
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While interests in confidentiality cannot justify withholding
suitably redacted witness interview notes, such notes are entitled to
protection as attorney work product, whether recorded by an attorney179
or an investigator.180 Rule 26(b)(3), which codifies the word product
doctrine, ordinarily allows disclosure “upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” While
withholding the identity of an informant effectively prevents the
defendant from obtaining the “substantial equivalent” of the statement by
way of deposition,181 notes of witness interviews are “opinion work
product” entitled to heightened protection. In Upjohn Co. v. United
States,182 the Supreme Court held that “[f]orcing an attorney to disclose
notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly
disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental processes”183
Accordingly, “[n]otes and memoranda of an attorney, or an attorney’s
agent, from a witness interview are opinion work product entitled to
almost absolute immunity.”184
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CONCLUSION
Sound public policy warrants protecting the identities of nontestifying confidential informants from disclosure absent a showing of
genuine need by the defendant. This principle should be regularly
applied in securities and other private attorney general litigation.
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